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Victor Hansen*
The theme of our presentation is "Military Jurisprudence: Bastion of
Conservatism or Progressive Problem Solver." I believe that all of us on this
panel can agree that in many respects the military and military jurisprudence
reflects an innovative pragmatism. This innovative approach is necessary and
important if we are to adapt to the evolving nature of warfare. In order to stay
relevant and to serve our clients, military lawyers and military law has often
been a progressive problem solver.
Yet, the reality is that, in some ways, it definitely is a mixed bag as to
whether military jurisprudence is a progressive problem solver or a bastion of
conservatism. This mixed bag is often reflected in the way the military has
applied the law of war in the international context verses the way the military
has developed and applied the law of war domestically.
One interesting aspect of the recently passed Military Commissions Act
(MCA)' is the portion of Subchapter VII of the act which sets forth the
substantive offenses to be tried by military commissions. According to section
950p, the purpose of this subsection is to "codify offenses that have tradition-
ally been triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish new
crimes that did not exist.., but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military
commission."2
Following this explanation, the MCA then first codifies certain criminal
law doctrines that are not enumerated offenses but rather reflect broader
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criminal law concepts that developed in the common law. These broader
concepts include liability of a principal, liability of an accessory, and the
inchoate concepts of attempt and solicitation.3
The MCA next sets out the elements of some twenty-eight offenses that
can be tried by military commissions. These offenses include murder of
protected persons,4 murder in violation of the law of war,5 attacking civilians,6
attacking protected property,7 pillaging,' denying quarter,9 taking hostages,'l
rape," sexual assault, 2 and other offenses. I view the codification of these
crimes that are triable by military commission as a positive development. This
codification provides clearer standards and greater clarity which should allow
both the prosecution and the defense the ability to try cases in military
commissions in a more efficient and fair manner. This is an example of a
pragmatic solution to the problem that under the law of war and under
international law it is often unclear what the criminal standards are and what
criminal elements exist for offenses under the law of war.
One of the most interesting aspects of this codification effort is the MCA's
definition of "principals." Along with the traditional definition that most of us
are familiar with, section 950q states:
Any person is punishable as a principal... who-(3) is a superior
commander who, with regard to acts punishable under this chapter,
knew, or had reason to know, or should have known, that a
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 3
Anyone familiar with the Yamashita tribunal, the Nuremberg war Crimes
Tribunals, or the Tokyo Trials will certainly recognize that this provision is an
attempt to codify the doctrine of command responsibility into the law of
principals. By command responsibility, I am referring to that notion of imputed
3. See, e.g., id at § 950q, r, t, u.
4. Id. at § 950v(b)(1).
5. Id. at § 950v(b)(15).
6. MCA, supra note 1, at § 950v(b)(2).
7. Id. at § 950v(b)(4).
8. Id. at § 950v(b)(5).
9. Id. at § 950v(b)(6).
10. Id. at § 950v(b)(7).
11. MCA, supra note 1, at § 950v(b)(2 1).
12. Id. at § 950v(b)(22).
13. Id. at § 950q(3).
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derivative liability, where the superior has a duty to control his forces and
prevent them from committing law of war violations. 4 If the superior fails to
perform this duty in preventing, stopping or punishing law of war violations,
the crimes committed by his subordinates can be imputed to the commander.
This doctrine has existed under international law certainly since the end
of WWII, and has been codified in more recent international treaties and
statutes including Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,15 Article 7 of
the statute on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), 6 Article 6 of the statute on the International Criminal Tribunal For
Rwanda (ICTR),17 and Article 28 of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court.18
An interesting point to note about the codification of the doctrine under the
MCA is the MCA's treatment of the mens rea of command responsibility. The
MCA seems to adopt a hodgepodge of mens rea components including actual
knowledge, "had reason to know," as well as a "should have known" standard.
Clearly this approach is an attempt to extend liability as broadly as possible,
short of vicarious or strict liability on the part of the superior commander.
Another interesting point with the MCA's codification of this doctrine is
that a superior can be liable as a principal even if his failure was nothing more
than a failure to punish past violations committed by forces currently under his
command. A situation could arise where a person who was not the superior at
the time the offenses were committed can still be liable as if he committed the
offenses. Assume a superior takes command of the forces after the war crimes
were committed, but before they were discovered. The new commander then
ether discovers or fails to discover the crimes, and does not take action to
punish his subordinates. That commander can now be punished as if he
14. I have provided a more complete analysis of the doctrine of command responsibility, its
development in international law, and the need for the United States to incorporate this doctrine into domestic
law in an article to be published in the forthcoming Volume 42:3 of the Gonzaga Law Review.
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted
in Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, andRelating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978).
16. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (Feb. 22, 1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY] reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). On
the ICTY, see generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
17. The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. SIRES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
18. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/COND.
183/9 (July 17,1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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committed the offenses, even though he was not in command at the time the
offenses were committed. I would posit that this is quite a broad application of
the command responsibility doctrine.
This codification of command responsibility in the MCA is a clear
example of how military jurisprudence is both a progressive problem solver
and, in some instances, a bastion of conservatism. When one looks at U.S.
domestic law reflected in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), there
is no comparable codification of the command responsibility doctrine. While
we are willing to hold superior commanders of other forces criminally liable for
the law of war violations committed by their forces, we are unable, or at least
unwilling, to hold our own commanders to a similar standard.
Some have argued that Article 18 of the UCMJ 19 already incorporates the
doctrine of command responsibility into the UCMJ because Article 18 grants
general courts-martial jurisdiction over any person who by the law of war is
subject to trial by military tribunal. However, this argument fails for several
reasons. Most significantly, the command responsibility doctrine under the law
of war is not sufficiently clear and any attempt to prosecute an American
solider under the vague law of war standard is likely to run afoul of
fundamental constitutional protections. In addition, it has long been the policy
of the United States not to try our own forces for violations of the law of war,
but rather to try them for violations of the punitive articles under the UCMJ.20
So, this is an example where military jurisprudence has been both a
progressive problem solver and a bastion of conservativism. The MCA's
codification of offenses triable under military commissions is a positive
development. However, this codification should give us some pause to question
whether the standards we are codifying, and that we are holding our enemies to,
are the same standards of accountability we hold our own forces to. In the case
of command responsibility, a double standard exists. I believe that this double
standard must be eliminated. While I do not have time to discuss the most
effective way to incorporate the doctrine of command responsibility under
domestic law in this forum, there are some points to consider.
Command responsibility should not be an expansion of the law of
principles as has been done under the MCA. Were the U.S. to take this
approach, commanders could potentially be liable for any offense committed
by the forces under their command in peace or in war, and liability would not
be limited only to law of war violations or similar offenses. I believe that a
much more comprehensive amending of the UCMJ is necessary. The
19. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE § 818, art. 18, reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES at A2-6 (2005).
20. See Dep't of the Army, FM 27-10 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE APPENDIX A-120, para. 507(b) (1956).
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amendment should clearly set out a commander's special legal relationship and
legal duty regarding his obligations to prevent his forces from committing
violations of the law of war and similar offenses. I also believe that the mens
rea of command responsibility should be more clearly and precisely defined
than any of the formulations that currently exist under international law and
under the MCA. Additionally, I believe that various degrees of punishment
should be imposed based on the commander's degree of liability. Only if we
are willing to apply the standards we use against other forces to our own forces,
will military jurisprudence truly be a progressive innovator and problem solver.
